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1. Introduction: The Political Context in 1945
Events at the end of World War II were pivotal for the future of the
Argentine labour movement. The military government that took power
in  1943,  headed  by  Colonel  Juan  Domingo  Perón,  was  intent  on
renewing the process of industrialisation initiated in the 1930s and at
the same time halting the spread of communism among the working
class. Perón was able to build upon his friendly relations with trade
union  leaders,  creating  a  durable  alliance  that  would  shape  the
contours of the labour movement and labour relations for decades.
Industrialisation in the 1930s had greatly expanded the working
class and the trade unions.  The 1930s had also created widespread
working-class discontent,  and with the end of the war approaching,
Perón and the military foresaw the coming of a dangerous period of
revolutionary turmoil. Through his office of the Secretaría de Trabajo
y Previsión, Perón shaped policies to stymie communism through both
repression  and  concessions  to  appease  workers’  political  and
economic  concerns.  This  ambiguous  and  reformist  set  of  policies
gradually became a grand political project, in which trade unions were
to play an integral, two-faceted role as partners in industrial expansion
and the backbone of an emergent national political movement.
After a decade of relative unity and growth, due in part to the
efforts  of  communist  activists,  the labour movement arrived at  this
historical conjuncture in a state of political division and organisational
standstill.  The  initial  response  of  trade  unions  to  the  sympathetic
attitude of Perón and public authorities oscillated between rejection,
mistrust and opportunism. However, within the major confederation,
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CGT  (Confederación  General  del  Trabajo),  several  unions  had
already shown during 1930s a growing disposition to ask the State to
mediate the relationships between capital and labour. Between 1943
and 1945, those trade unions that escaped repression came to accept
the new interventionism, consolidating their positions and obtaining
numerous benefits.  So too did newly organised unions,  which took
advantage of  State  support  in  their  struggle  against  the  bitter  anti-
unionism of most employers, even if State support meant replacing
communist union leadership. 
Employers and the landed elite, the core of the dominant class,
rejected the military government’s labour reforms and social policies.
They threw their weight behind a broad democratic front organised by
the  traditional  political  parties,  including  the  communists  and  the
socialists,  which sought to oust  the ruling military authorities.  This
political  front,  the  Unión Democrática,  framed its  discourse  in  the
rhetoric of antifascism, and despite the government’s announcement
of  democratic  elections  for  1946,  the  foreseeable  fall  of  Nazism
reinvigorated its attacks. Thus, in 1945 politics in Argentina became
deeply polarised,  reaching a peak in October when the government
decided to remove Perón from office as a sop to the hegemonic forces
leading  the  opposition.  However,  a  general  strike  and  massive
demonstrations in the main industrial cities frustrated this attempt on
17  October,  a  date  that  later  symbolised  the  ‘mythical’  birth  of
Peronism in  the  Argentinean  political  landscape.  In  February  1946
Perón was  elected President,  backed by the newly formed  Partido
Laborista, the  CGT and the massive vote  of  the  working-class;  he
would be re-elected in 1952 only to be removed from office in 1955
by a coup d’état. His period in power was crucial to the configuration
of  the  Argentine  industrial  relations  system,  the  political
consciousness of the working class, and the fate of trade unions. 
This  chapter  provides  an  overview  of  the  history  and
development of trade unionism in Argentina from 1945 to the present.
It  is  a  history,  rooted in a highly conflictual  political  environment,
which assesses trade unions both as institutions and as movements,
and the contradictions that emerge from this double identity. With this
in mind, two overlapping issues are treated throughout the chapter: the
features, peculiarities and patterns of change of the Argentine system
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of industrial  relations,  and the role of trade unions as channels for
worker mobilisation.
2. Industrial Relations in Argentina
The rise of Peronism was a watershed in the development of industrial
relations in Argentina; its legacy can still be found in current labour
legislation. Under Perón a voluntary system in which the State seldom
participated  as  mediator  of  conflicts  was  replaced  by  a  highly
regulated system in which the State played a central role, with the law
establishing  the  mechanisms  of  collective  agreements,  union
recognition  and  worker  representation.  This  juridification  of  the
industrial relations system began when Perón assumed office in the
Secretaría de Trabajo y Previsión  and continued over his first  two
democratic Presidencies (1946-55). Yet, it was an uneven process as
the  workplace  remained  quite  untouched  by  the  spread  of  legal
resolutions; and workers filled this vacuum on their own by setting up
vigorous structures for the advancement of their interests on the shop
floor. 
In 1945 the State enacted labour legislation that regulated trade
union representation by recognising only one organisation for each
industrial sector or economic activity. Through a legal authorisation,
personería gremial, obtained exclusively from the Ministry of Labour,
only one trade union was recognised as legally able to collectively
bargain agreements and represent workers in dealings with employers
or  the  courts.  This  had  the  effect  of  strengthening  trade  unions,
introducing  a  system  of  vertical  control  and  the  centralisation  of
decision-making.  At  the  same time,  a breach of  law,  or  ministerial
intervention, often put trade unions at risk of losing their  personería
gremial.  Although  in  principle  workers  could  freely  associate  and
organise themselves independently, a system of one trade union per
industrial  sector  and  highly  centralised  collective  bargaining  was
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created,  one  in  which  public  authorities  have  significant  power  to
exert pressure over employers’ and workers’ organisations.
At  times  fearful  of  the  union  power  resulting  from  this
centralisation, some governments awarded personería gremial to plant
unions, often sponsored by the enterprise, as was the case in the Fiat
automobile factories in the Province of Córdoba. By the end of 1960s,
however, these plant unions became the symbol of workers’ rebellion,
anti-bureaucratic and revolutionary, and thus governments quickly lost
interest in granting further personería gremial to plant unions. 
Trade union centralisation and the  personería gremial have led
unions to organise both white-collar with blue-collar workers. On rare
occasions supervisors and senior professional or technical grades have
had their own organisation; anti-labour legislation in the late 1950s
and 1960s sought to reduce union power by prohibiting at times the
joint  unionisation of blue-collar  and managerial  and technical  staff.
Monopoly of representation has also been strengthened by the use of
extension  mechanisms  that  allow  unions  operate  even  with  low
membership levels;  as will  be shown later,  union density has been
uneven but usually high in key sectors and in the public industries.
In 1946 the central role of the State in industrial relations was
enshrined in a national law (based on a 1944 Decree) that mandated
the presence and participation of public authorities in every collective
agreement.  In  1953  a  more  liberal  law  formally  recognised  the
autonomy of unions and employers, but two key prerogatives of the
Ministry of Labour remained: the final approval of the legal status of
any agreement (homologación) and the right to suggest modifications,
or reject, an agreement. In this sense, all bargaining agreements have
been tentative ones, presented by unions and employers to the public
authorities for their  approval.  Hence,  employers and unions usually
ask for official advice when they face an issue that might cause its
rejection. In 1958 a new law empowered the Ministry of Labour with
the right to force conflicting parts to accept the mediation of public
authorities  (conciliación  obligatoria),  during  which  trade  unions
cannot  take  industrial  action  of  any  kind.  The  Ministry  of  Labour
applies  mediation  with  discretion,  meaning  trade  unions  have  no
guarantee of getting a  conciliación obligatoria to fight dismissals or
other unfavourable situations.
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After  1955  frequent  coups  d’état often  distorted  the  right  to
bargain,  but  national  collective  agreements  continued  to  shape  the
field  of  industrial  relations,  partly  as  a  consequence  of  a  legal
disposition  by  which  agreements  remain  in  place  until  they  are
formally replaced or repealed (ultra-actividad). During the democratic
periods,  the  labour  movement  worked  energetically  to  defend  and
promote the system of national collective agreements and the model of
workers’ representation  and internal  unions’ structure  based  on  the
personería gremial, as shown by the labour reforms of 1974 and 1988
promoted by the labour movement. 
In  the  1990s,  however,  a  State-led  neo-liberal  offensive
(conducted,  ironically,  by a  Peronist  administration),  brought  about
important changes in individual labour rights and in the centralised
nature of the system of industrial relations, though much less in union
internal structures and procedures. 
During  the  first  term  (1989-95)  of  President  Menem’s
government,  unions  used  the  Labour  Law Commission  to  block  a
legislative  attempt  to  decentralise  collective  bargaining  and  make
labour  contracts  flexible,  but  a  1991  decree  linking  wage  rises  to
productivity growth undermined their position. The CGT had opposed
the decree on the grounds that it limited actors’ autonomy in collective
bargaining, but in practice the consequences of the 1991 decree have
been  even  deeper.  The  decree  impacted  on  the  whole  structure  of
collective bargaining by forcing unions to bargain over wages at the
firm level in order to take into account differentials in productivity
between  companies.  It  also  inhibited  corporatist  strategies  by
precluding  demands  for  governmental  wage  polices.  Thus,  trade
unions were obliged to bargain with employers about how to increase
productivity and to concede changes in the labour process that they
had  previously  resisted.  Nevertheless,  workers’  organisations  did
succeed in maintaining a centralised bargaining process by articulating
sector  and  local  negotiations.  In  1993  another  decree  instituted
bargaining at enterprise level; between 1995 and 2000, 90 per cent of
collective  agreements  were  of  that  kind.  Consequently,  national
collective bargaining in the private sector seemed to come to an end
by the second half of the decade. Yet, since 2003 trade unions have
recovered  the  traditional  practice  of  signing  national  and  sector
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agreements, although in combination with a profusion of decentralised
arrangements.  Although  decentralisation  still  prevails,  collective
bargaining  at  sector  and  national  level  has  a  direct  and  positive
bearing on the scope of coverage. In 2005, for instance, national and
sector  agreements  compromised 36 per  cent  of  all  agreements,  but
they covered 92 per cent of all wage-labourers who benefited from
collective  negotiations.  Moreover,  93  per  cent  of  these  agreements
resulted  in  wage  increases  against  78  per  cent  of  the  agreements
reached at firm level.
These general reforms of the system went hand in hand in the
1990s with a series of laws and decrees aimed specifically to alter
industrial  relations  in  public  companies  and  break  trade  unions’
capacity to obstruct privatisation policies. The collective agreements
signed by unions with public companies in sectors like electricity, oil,
water  or  gas,  had  been  the  most  advanced  and  protective,  and
therefore, a model to be followed by other workers’ organisations. In
the logic of the neo-liberal offensive, public sector agreements were
major  obstacles  to  be  removed.  This  challenge  to  public  sector
agreements  was led  by  a  horde of  consultants  paid through World
Bank loans, and their negotiations with managers, trade union officers,
and authorities eventually led to the suspension of 718 clauses from
collective agreements in 13 public enterprises. The legal foundations
of this assault were two laws passed immediately after the election of
Menem, promulgated to deal with the economic emergency signalled
by the hyperinflation peak of 1989, and to begin the neo-liberal reform
of the State in accordance with the prerogatives of the Washington
Consensus for Latin America. 
In sum, until  the 1990s the bargaining process was centralised
and  heavily  dependent  on  the  State.  Decentralisation  has  been
introduced into the system, but trade unions have recently recovered
their  ability  to  maintain national  and sector  level  agreements  to  an
important degree. Thus, the basic foundation of the system is still the
collective  agreement,  signed  by  the  organisation  with  personería
gremial,  even though this arrangement has been targeted by a new
national trade union confederation (CTA), which emerged in 1993 in
open opposition to the neo-liberal turn of the Peronist administration.
Since  then,  the  CTA has  sought  to  sanction  a  pluralist  model  of
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representation  whereas  the  CGT  has  defended  the  historical
arrangement. 
Beneath  the  juridification  of  industrial  relations,  beyond  the
reach of labour law, the years of Peronism also meant the development
of robust shop steward structures, the so-called  comisiones internas,
which  overcame the  juridical  vacuum of  industrial  relations  at  the
workplace. In fact, they have been an essential aspect of the system;
the  ability  of  the  unions  to  make  employers  respect  the  collective
agreements at the workplace has often depended on their strength. 
Legal  recognition of  this  aspect  of  industrial  relations  did not
develop until 1958, when the shop stewards obtained  fuero sindical,
the  same  legal  protection  against  dismissals  and  other  anti-union
policies that had been accorded to full-time union officers in 1945.
But the 1958 law, apart from this formal recognition, did not specify
shop stewards’ prerogatives; these began to be defined in practice by
collective  agreements  and  trade  union  rule  books  since  the  early
1950s. The strength of the comisión interna rested on several factors:
the level of unionisation of the industrial sector, the size of the factory,
the nature of the labour process, and the extent of mobilisation on the
shop floor. There have always been workplaces with only one shop
steward and others in which robust comisiones internas are led by an
executive committee elected by the entire workforce in open electoral
contests. Since 1974 there have attempts to limit the number of shop
stewards in accordance with the size of the workforce but trade unions
have usually succeeded, at least until  the 1990s, in increasing their
number  through collective  bargaining.  In  the  1990s  this  trend  was
reversed. Shop stewards must be union members but they are elected
by all workers at the workplace. This is a crucial feature as this gives
them authority with both managers and the trade union. From their
very inception, the  comisiones internas  have been the last resort for
workers to defend their autonomy and exercise their democratic rights,
even against their own organisations. 
While collective bargaining has tended to revolve around wage
matters, in Argentina the comisiones internas have directly challenged
managerial control over the labour process and working conditions. As
stated above, they were also the only effective way of guaranteeing
the fulfilment of collective agreements at the workplace. 
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Since the economic crisis of 1952, when industrial productivity
started to show signs of stagnation, employers’ associations launched
an  offensive  against  the  prerogatives  of  the  comisiones  internas.
Firstly, during the last three years of Peronism, by consensual means;
later on, through restructuring and anti-union policies; and during the
dictatorship  of  1976-1983,  through  a  repressive  wave  that  in  the
workplace  translated  into  massive  dismissals,  killings  and  the
disappearance  of  shop  stewards  and  activists.  Workers’ opposition
manifested itself during these years in strikes and conflicts often led
secretly by  comisiones internas.  The system of  comisiones internas
recovered somewhat in the 1980s but weakened again in the 1990s. In
2005, according to the Ministry of Labour (Ministerio de Trabajo y
Seguridad Social – MTySS), 62.8 per cent of firms have unionised
workers, approximately but 85 per cent of them do not face shop-floor
structures of representation. The official data also shows that while a
small majority (52.5 per cent) of shop stewards operates in the larger
companies (with more than 200 employees), their ability to represent
workers in medium firms (between 40 and 200) and small enterprises
(less than 40 employees) remain very low (27.7 per cent and 7.5 per
cent  respectively).  Thus the system of  shop stewards operates  in  a
small percentage of firms (the survey found shop stewards in only 15
per  cent  of  firms),  but  they  represent  a  sizeable  percentage  of  the
workforce (39 per cent of the total workers). Still, all important labour
conflicts in contemporary Argentina involve the comisiones internas,
as shown by the recent strikes in the underground, hospitals, teachers,
textiles, the automotive industry, and the like. 
As will be discussed later, a contradictory tendency has always
characterised  trade  unionism  in  Argentina.  On  the  one  hand,  the
juridification of the system of industrial relations and the relationships
between  trade  unions  and  the  Peronist  political  movement  has
generated  a  powerful  bureaucracy.  On  the  other  hand,  grassroots
worker mobilisation comes to the fore time and again, often through
the  revitalisation  of  the  comisiones  internas  in  open  confrontation
with national or regional trade union leaderships.
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3. Union Density since 1945
Statistics  about  union membership and rates  of  union density  have
always been among the most favoured means used by labour scholars
to measure the health and power of trade unions. While density rates
cannot always be determined with a high degree of accuracy, density
deserves careful consideration in any history of the labour movement.
It is difficult to follow the historical evolution of density as, in
the  case  of  Argentina,  data  are  often  unreliable  and  their  use
problematic.  Trade  unions  have  usually  overestimated  membership
levels,  public  authorities  have  not  kept  accurate  records  in  every
period, scholars have used very different sources and methodologies,
and thus research outcomes vary widely. Indeed, some authors have
argued  that  determining  density  rates  in  Argentina  is  virtually
impossible.  Yet  available  estimates  help allow us  trace the  general
development of union membership since the end of the World War II.
The first years of Peronism witnessed spectacular union growth.
Many scholars regard this as the rise of a trade unionism strengthened
from  above.  However,  as  Louise  Doyon  (2006)  has  shown,  this
growth in fact represented the hectic pace of union activism that took
advantage  of  a  favourable  institutional  and  political  context.  The
intense  labour  conflicts  that  characterised  the  years  1946  to  1948,
during  the  negotiations  of  collective  agreements,  support  Doyon’s
argument. Rapid union growth occurred at a time of clashes between
the leadership of certain trade unions,  although most  of  them were
enrolled in the Peronist movement, and public authorities. The latter
resorted  to  the  increasingly  subordinated  CGT  to  discipline  these
conflicts and displace nonconformist leaderships. This would become
clear  during  the  years  between  1948  and  1951  in  the  strikes  by
workers in the meat,  textile,  print,  sugar, and oil  industries and the
bank  and  railway  sectors,  among  others.  But  the  attempt  to
subordinate  the  labour  movement  to  the  developing  public  policy
process did not inhibit the rate of unionisation (Table 1). 
Table 1. Total Membership of Argentine Unions, 1936-1986
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Year Membership
1936 370,000
1945 528,000
1946 877,330
1948 1,532,925
1950 1,992,404
1954 2,256,000
1965 1,765,000
1984-6 3,972,000
It was only after the 1955 military coup that union membership
fell due to political factors. Between 1955 and 1958, the government
took  possession  of  the  trade  unions  by  imposing  a  military
administration,  outlawed  all  trade  unions’  leaders  who  had  run
workers’  organisation  between  1953  and  1955,  and  suspended
collective agreements.  Torre (1973) set  the rate of union density in
1964 between 30.62 per cent and 35.75 per cent depending on whether
managers, professionals and technical staff are taken into account or
not,  while  Lamadrid  and  Orsatti  (1991)  argued  that  union  density
oscillated  around  40  per  cent  in  mid-1960s.  Most  studies  agree,
however,  that  after  1963-4,  there  was  a  recovery  in  the  rate  of
unionisation and even certain stabilisation around 43 to 47 per cent,
except  during  the  military  government  of  1976-1983,  which  had  a
negative, although surprisingly slight, effect on union membership. 
Today there are debates about the effects of neo-liberalism on
trade unions, and in particular, on the rate of unionisation. Again, the
lack of a reliable historical data makes firm conclusions impossible.
Nevertheless,  there  is  a  general  agreement  that  since  1990  union
membership  and  union  density  did  fall.  Yet,  available  estimates
suggest that the decline of the latter has not been dramatic in the last
two decades,  despite  the  wide-ranging  process  of  state  and capital
counter-mobilisation (Table 2). 
Table 2. Trade Union Density in Argentina according to different
sources.
Year James (1990)
% union density 
1941 20
1948 30.5
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1954 42.5
Lamadrid and Orsatti (1991)
1954 48 
1963 40 
1974 43 
1979 42 
1982-83 41 
1989 44 
Marshall and Perelman (2004)
1990 47 
1991-94 44-47
2001 42 
ETE (2005) EIL (2005) 
20051 37.6 37
That decline has not been greater is surprising for a country in
which incentives for organising are few: union finances do not depend
exclusively on members fees; the personería gremial, by securing the
legal  monopoly of  collective bargaining representation,  reduces  the
likelihood of inter-union disputes; collective agreements apply to non-
union members;  demands are often channelled through institutional
mechanisms  of  political  exchange;  and  the  mobilising  capacity  of
trade unions goes far beyond their memberships. Even incorporating
the lowest estimates, that is those provided by ETE and EIL for 2005,
union  density  remains  well  above  most  industrialised  economies,
where according to Visser (2006) the decline have been much more
marked.
However, the index of union density today might be deceitful.
While  at  first  sight,  union  density  is  still  statistically  high,  it  is
necessary  to  take  into  account  the  number  of  unregistered  wage-
labourers since it is unlikely that these workers are equally able to join
trade  unions.  At  the  beginning  of  2007,  41.6  per  cent  of  the  total
1  Unfortunately,  there  are  no  historical  series  of  rates  measured  by
Encuesta  a Trabajadores  en la  Empresa (ETE) and Encuesta  de Indicadores
Laborales  (EIL)  and  carried  out  by  the  Ministerio  de  Trabajo,  Empleo  y
Seguridad  Social  (MTySS),  both  in  2005.  These  figures  correspond  to
registered wage labourers employed in private firms with 10 or more workers;
that is, they incorporate neither registered workers from firms with less than 10
employees, nor public sector workers (8  per cent and 38 per cent respectively
of the total registered employees in 2001; figures form MTySS and the National
Institute for Statistics, INDEC). 
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number  of  wage-labourers  corresponded  to  unregistered  labour,
whereas  from  1992  to  1996  the  rate  of  unregistered  employees
oscillated between 22 and 25 per  cent.  Thus,  surely,  union density
among unionisable workers remains relatively high, whereas more and
more wage labourers are outside the reach of trade union organisation.
Moreover,  union  density  says  nothing  about  why  (or  how)  trade
unions have maintained their relative position. Nor does union density
provide insight on the actual weaknesses of workplace structures as
shown in the previous section. Thus, important as it is, the evolution
of union density reveals a partial picture of the health and strength of
trade unionism in Argentina since 1945.
4. The Obras Sociales
Trade unions in  Argentina have strongly influenced national  policy
during the second post-war.  Among other measures,  they helped to
shape the system of social security through the obras sociales. These
institutions  are  among the  most  salient  features  of  Argentine  trade
unionism.  Through them,  unions provide workers  with health  care,
recreation  centres,  tourism,  professional  education,  personal  loans,
housing schemes, and the like; many hospitals,  hotels and workers`
neighbourhoods have been financed by the obras sociales. 
They  are  rooted  in  the  old  sociedades  de  socorros  mutuos
(friendly  societies)  by  which  workers  developed  voluntary
associations  for  mutual  assistance  since  the  end  of  the  nineteenth
century. The aim of this form of workers’ solidarity was to provide
elementary or minimal protection to members in cases of emergency
or  risks  associated  to  work-life:  strike  support,  funeral  services,
retirement,  and  health  care.  They  were  a  result  of  scarce  public
mechanisms during industrialisation. Between 1910 and 1930, a group
of  powerful  unions  in  key  sectors  of  the  economy,  and  therefore
capable of exerting pressure over the State, obtained pension funds for
their sector in exchange for social peace. This reinforced a system of
insurance  that,  while  based  on  the  economic  power  of  workers,
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reproduced social  iniquity  and divisions.  To reverse  this  trend,  the
CGT in the 1930s campaigned for a public and universal system of
social  security.  Between  1943  and  1946,  about  111  measures
concerning basic  aspects  of  social  security  were enacted,  including
annual  bonuses,  paid  holidays,  extension  of  the  severance  pay,
disability indemnity for all employees (except for domestic servants),
payment for all  public holidays, regulation of the working days for
different trade unions, and regulation of child labour. This system of
basic rights was later  augmented by the development  of  the  obras
sociales.
The obras sociales were established primarily between 1948 and
the  early  1960s  through collective  agreements  with  employers  and
backed by the State. Both sides finance the  obras sociales, but trade
unions run the administration.  In  1970 employers  and unions were
compelled  by  law  to  create  obras  sociales,  not  only  for  union
members and their families, but also for workers in the same sector, as
far as they contribute to their financial support. Thus, a worker could
contribute to the obra social without being a trade union member. This
somewhat compensated the union for free riders (since 1953 collective
bargaining  covers  both  members  and  non-members).  All  workers
therefore contributed to the financial strength of the trade union, and
unions provided expanding social and recreational services for their
members: for instance, in 1967 there were 8 union-owned hotels, 62
such hotels by 1973 and 90 by 1983; until the 1990s only trade union
members  could  seek  accommodation  in  these  hotels.  The  essential
task of the  obras sociales has always been the provision of health
care.  Unions  built  dozens  of  hospitals,  clinics  and  others  for  the
exclusive use of their members.
These  institutions  became  one  of  the  pillars  of  the  country’s
health and social security system and a source of power in political
exchanges with public authorities. Indeed, their reinforcement by law
in 1970 was an act of political exchange in search of trade unions’
temporary acquiescence to the political proscription of Peronism by a
military  dictatorship.  Since then,  every attempt  to  undermine trade
unions’ power  has  involved an  attack on their  obras sociales.  The
military coup of 1976 first removed workers’ from the administration
of most obras sociales and replaced them with military functionaries.
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A 1980 law formally eliminated trade unions’ control by incorporating
the  obras sociales into the  Ministerio de Acción Social.  Although a
democratic government assumed office in 1983, trade unions had to
wait  until  1989  to  recover  their  control.  In  1992  a  Peronist
Government attempted to privatise and deregulate the pension system
and  the  obras  sociales.  However,  union’s  leadership  was  able  to
negotiate  important  compensations;  in  both  reforms,  the  CGT
negotiated  its  participation  as  service  provider.  Therefore,  the
government  explicitly  included  a  provision  for  unions  to  create
pension funds and restricted competition in the social security system
to  existing  obras  sociales,  that  is,  excluding  new  private  health
insurance companies during an undefined transitional period starting
in 1993. The following year unions secured from the government the
right  to  offer  insurance  for  work  accidents.  In  addition,  unions
obtained subsidies for restructuring the obras sociales, and a bail out
of debts accrued from social security provisions. 
Deregulation  of  the  system  posed  a  new  threat  to  unions  as
workers were free to choose from different obras sociales; almost 1.4
million workers did so between 1998 and 2005. This was expected to
have a detrimental  effect on poorer unions, and more generally,  on
union  density  as  the  identity  forged  by  trade  unions  between  the
organisation and the  obra social would be severed. Some imagined
this would lead to more active and innovative trade union recruiting
efforts,  but  this  did  not  occur.  While  in  general  industrial  unions
reinforced the identity between the organisation and  obras sociales,
the strategy of service sector unions has been to adopt a commercial
attitude focused on the improvement of the services provided by their
obra social and appeal to workers in other job categories. In this latter
case, the usual losses in union membership were to be compensated
financially by the income generated by their obras sociales. 
Negotiations  between  the  CGT and  the  government  over  the
obras  sociales contributed  to  the  development  of  a  new  style  of
unionism since  the  mid  1990s,  one  built  around  the  new business
opportunities opened to the union leadership in exchange for social
peace and ideological support (or at least partial acquiescence) to the
neo-liberal  project  in  Argentina.  This  new  union  style  involves  a
twofold strategy:  the reinforcement of worker solidarity around the
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organisation, and an entrepreneurial project to generate new revenues
to  increase and strengthen unions’ social  services.  Evidence shows
that the unions have neglected the former while developing the latter.
This  new  style  has  gone  beyond  any  previous  use  of  the  obras
sociales as a financial source of power towards a truly entrepreneurial
unionism,  which  assumed  directly  the  function  of  capital  in  the
running of a diverse portfolio of businesses. However, it is important
to stress that this entrepreneurial style of unionism has not become
hegemonic within the  labour movement,  although its  influence and
ideological impact can not be underestimated. 
5. Trade Union Mobilisation after World War II
Trade union development at the institutional and organisational level
cannot  be  understood  without  an  understanding  of  the  broader
dynamics  of  class  struggle  and  the  role  played  by  workplace
organisations.  While  trade  union  mobilisation  made  Peronism
possible, the economic crisis of 1951-2 jeopardised the link between
the two. At that time, both public authorities and employers arrived at
the same conclusion:  economic stagnation and the lag in industrial
productivity  were  both  due  to  trade  union  power  at  the  point  of
production.  In  particular,  employers  found  in  the  spread  of  the
comisiones internas the principal challenge to managerial prerogatives
and, hence, the main obstacle to firm restructuring. Employers sought
to regain full control of the labour process and increase profit rates
through productivity increases and labour exploitation. With Perón in
power, workers and trade unions successfully resisted such attempts
since they were the principle supporters of the government. But from
that time onward, the struggle between trade unions, local and foreign
capitalists, and the dominant groups within and behind the State has
revolved around productivity growth. At the same time the post-war
dynamic of class confrontation focused on inflationary pressures, as
capitalists sought to claw back wage increases through higher prices. 
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In 1953 and 1955 the Peronist administration issued official calls
to increase productivity by consensual means. While the trade union
leadership paid lip service to this aim, the comisiones internas blocked
any restructuring attempt. Thus, after the military coup of September
1955, the ideal of the social pact was abandoned; instead, employers
and public authorities deployed a multifaceted counter-offensive. 
On  the  shop-floor,  authoritarian  managerial  policies  were
pursued against a backdrop of the generally anti-labour orientation of
the  State  between 1955 and 1973.  In  law the  counter-offensive  of
public  authorities  meant  the  suspension  (apart  from  a  few  partial
exceptions)  of  collective  bargaining  during  military  governments
(1955-8 and 1966-73),  and also in  1974 when the social  pact  was
revived  by  Perón  in  his  third  Presidency.  Both  military  and  semi-
democratic governments aimed to reform labour law as to undermine
union power in 1956 and 1966; in the main, by attempting to establish
a  multi-union  model  of  organisation,  control  the  activities  of
comisiones internas and prohibit trade union involvement in politics.
But these legal strategies failed. 
After the fall of Perón the political dimension was crucial. As in
1945,  when  the  political  offensive  of  the  ruling  classes  pushed
workers  to  add their  organisational  strength to  the  political  project
built  around  this  charismatic  figure,  after  1955,  the  anti-labour
orientation of the State reinforced the bond between trade unions and
Peronism, which in turn based itself on the support of workers for its
social programme. 1957 and 1958 witnessed the so-called Resistencia
Peronista,  which  involved  workplace  struggles  through  mostly
clandestine  comisiones  internas to  regain  the  control  of  their
organisations.  Contrary  to  governmental  expectations,  the
identification of workers with  Peronism  spread. While in 1960, 52.2
per cent of trade unions belonging to the CGT were also members of
the political bone of Peronist trade unions, the 62 Organizaciones, in
1972,  this  figure climbed up to 86.5 per cent.  Despite the political
proscription  of  Peronism and  the  exile  of  their  political  leader,  or
perhaps because of it, since trade unions embodied as a consequence
the political representation of  Peronist workers, Perón won the 1973
election obtaining more than 60 per cent of votes. 
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Although  unable  to  block  the  employer  offensive  over
productivity, trade unions maintained a high level of mobilisation and
political  influence.  Their  financial  power  grew  together  with  the
recovery of union membership and the development of obras sociales;
their  internal  structure,  their  centralism and their  bargaining power
also survived employer and State attacks, which became evident when
Perón returned to the Presidency as well as in the collective bargaining
round of 1975. As a result, real wages reached their historic peak in
the mid 1970s. These redistributive gains were, partly, the outcome of
workers’ autonomous mobilisation. They were also partly the result of
union bureaucracy becoming enmeshed in the State apparatus when
Perón assumed his third Presidency in 1973. This position allowed the
traditional  union  bureaucracy  to  face  the  growing  grassroots
challenges  and  labour  conflicts  that  had  been  alarming  the  ruling
classes  since  the  end  of  1960s.  Grassroots  mobilisations  were
particularly intense in 1975, when the working-class opposed through
their  unions  and  beyond  them,  the  attempt  to  introduce  economic
adjustment programmes. 
The 1976 civic-military coup aimed to crush workers’ power in
society, including trade union power. The government and employers
repressed  workshop  representatives  through  a  concerted  attack,
reduced the role of trade unions as political actors, passed anti-union
laws and introduced reforms to curb their financial power. Workers
resisted  through  scattered  but  persistent  strikes  and  sabotages;
comisiones internas gradually reappeared and the labour movement
was  able  to  launch  three  general  strikes  that  contributed  to  the
weakening military power. The most radical trends and revolutionary
activism  had  been  removed  from  the  workplace  by  repression,
however,  while  the  union  bureaucracy  had  retreated,  and  a  tiny
minority even collaborated with military authorities. When democracy
returned in 1983, union bureaucracy showed once again its power to
prevent challenges to their legal basis of power, this time threatened
by the Government of Alfonsín (from the Partido Radical historically
opposed to the  Peronist, Partido Justicialista). Overall, trade unions
had lost the initiative of the late 1960s and early 1970s; the dominant
classes and the State bureaucracy maintained hegemony despite their
highly unpopular economic policies. 
17
Maurizio Atzeni and Pablo Ghigliani
Nevertheless,  between  1983 and 1990,  the  bulk  of  the  labour
movement defended its  organisational  and financial basis of power,
pursued  its  redistributive  goals,  sought  political  influence  and
confronted  openly  the  neo-liberal  agenda  through  thirteen  general
strikes. But the hyperinflationary spirals of 1989-90 would change the
political and economic arena against trade union traditional practices
and aims. 
6. The 1990s and Neo-Liberalism
The  1989  election  of  Menem,  a  Peronist,  to  the  presidency
represented, as in mid 1940s, a watershed in many aspects, though this
time against the interest of workers and their trade unions. Contrary to
the historical conjuncture in which  Peronism  assumed office in mid
1940s, the working class by the late 1980s were in disarray, suffering
from hyperinflation and declining real wages. 
The hyperinflation spiral of 1989 is often cited as an essential
pre-condition of  neo-liberalism in Argentina.  Scholars from diverse
ideological  perspectives  agree  that  this  crisis  helped  to  overcome
resistance  within  civil  society,  particularly  that  of  trade  unions.
Hyperinflation paved the way for a wide programme of reforms, of
which  privatisation  was  decisive.  Trade  union  leaders  found
themselves suddenly trapped; the vast majority of trade unions openly
opposed  the  neo-liberal  turn,  but  most  of  them  declined  to  take
industrial action in the midst of a severe economic and social crisis.
The  ideological  and  political  consequences  of  hyperinflation
were immense. Its disciplining effects upon the population have been
compared to  those of  a  dictatorship or  political  repression.  Indeed,
Thwaites Rey (2003) argues that both the political terror visited on
society by the dictatorship (1976-83) and the economic terror of the
hyperinflation  explained  the  popular  tolerance  to  the  neo-liberal
reforms of beginnings of 1990s. 
At the same time, hyperinflation meant the final surrender of the
main political parties to the influence and the privatisation schemes of
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the IMF and the World Bank, which shaped State decision-making on
the  country’s  economic  and social  policies.  The implementation  of
these programmes required a redefinition of Argentine trade unionism
in  relation  with  the  State  and  the  Partido  Justicialista.  Menem’s
tenure  in  office  (1989-95;  1995-9)  meant  for  workers  a  radical
departure  from  the  idealised  social  justice  and  class  harmony
promoted by Peronism. In particular the Menem years broke the idea
of  development  and  redistribution  with  the  State  as  mediator  and
protector  of  workers.  The  Peronist ideology  of  the  majority  of
Argentine  trade  unions  was  put  into  crisis  by  a  system that  while
reducing their political and financial power was pushing many unions
to reorient their organisational and mobilising strategies. Trade unions
lost influence within the Partido Justicialista and the Parliament. Yet,
neo-liberal  policies,  and  their  negative  consequences  in  terms  of
employment, plus the ongoing internal conflicts of trade unions over
their  nature  and  their  relations  with  the  political  power  structure,
produced new labour struggles too. These struggles have led to the
detachment of some groups of workers from traditional trade unions,
the emergence of anti-bureaucratic organisations at local level, and the
development of alternative trade union confederations.
The neo-liberal agenda of the New Right was put into practice
mainly through the privatisation of public companies, fiscal bonuses
to  attract  multinational  investments,  anti-inflationary  monetary
policies, reduction of public employees, cutting public expenditures,
privatisation  of  social  security  services,  and  labour  flexibility.  The
Convertibility Plan introduced by minister Cavallo in 1991, fixing the
peso to the US dollar, stopped hyperinflation, produced stability and
market confidence, creating the conditions for a period of economic
growth (during 1991-7 GDP increased at an annual average rate of 6.1
per cent)  and created consensus among bourgeois parties and State
bureaucracies. 
Economic stability  did not  correspond to better  conditions  for
workers.  The official  unemployment rate rose from 6,9 per cent  in
1991 to 18,4 per cent in 1995, while underemployment in the same
years rose from 8,6 per cent to 11,3 per cent. And by the end of 1997
the  fact  that  neo-liberal  policies  were  explicitly  showing  their
weaknesses  not  just  in  terms  of  social  marginalisation  but  also  in
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terms of economic growth was already clear to  Argentine business
representatives too. 
In the beginning the CGT remained, despite internal divisions,
politically loyal to Menem. But soon the unions became a target for
the  government  because of  their  potential  mobilising capacity.  The
government repressed by force every attempt to oppose privatisation,
such  as  the  resistance  by  telephone  (1990-1)  and  railway  workers
(1991-2).  Moreover, unions’ financial and organisational power and
political centrality were targeted by the attack on their Obras Sociales
and  the  decentralisation  of  collective  bargaining.  Concomitantly,
public authorities invited unions to participate in the privatisation of
public companies and in the business of investing the funds collected
for pensions and social services.
For the first time in Argentine history a Peronist administration
explicitly  attacked the organisation and structure  of trade unionism
and workers’ rights.  This attack provoked political  crisis within the
labour  movement  and  a  split  between  the  central  bureaucracy  and
shop floor delegates.  On the one hand,  trade unions were facing a
direct  attack  on  their  autonomy  and  political  power  from  a
government that they had helped put into power. On the other hand,
labour  reforms,  consistently  reducing  workers’ rights  and  benefits,
were demoralising ordinary workers sapping their willingness to act.
At  the  institutional  level,  the  contradictory  relations  between
Menemism and  traditional  unionism generated  a  split  in  the  CGT
between those unions (or union leaders) supporting Menem’s reforms
and aiming to participate in the business produced by the privatisation
of social security, and those promoting opposition both in politics and
at  the  workplace  level.  In  1992  the  CTA  (Congreso  de  los
Trabajadores  Argentinos)  was  created  mainly  by  public  workers’
unions. This new confederation was a departure from the traditional
model embodied by the CGT. In particular, the CTA aimed to organise
both worker and unemployed struggles that were emerging in different
parts of the country; it opposed  personería gremial  and promoted a
pluralist model of representation; and it advocated independence from
the State and from the  Partido Justicialista. In 1994 another split in
the  CGT  led  to  the  creation  of  the  MTA  (Movimiento  de  los
Trabajadores Argentinos) with the aim of recovering the tradition of
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Peronism to oppose the neo-liberal agenda. The trade union’ leaders
loyal to Menem and his reforms remained in the CGT. This group, in
July  1994,  subscribed  with  the  government  and  employers
associations  to  a  general  agreement  (Acuerdo  Macro)  that,  while
recognising  CGT  financial  autonomy  and  maintaining  collective
bargaining at central level, allowed for labour flexibility (reduction of
labour  rights)  at  workplace  level.  By  the  end  of  Menem’s  second
presidency, however, union opposition grew. The CGT with support
from CTA and MTA called four general strikes in an attempt to block
government efforts to decentralise collective bargaining. The success
of  these demonstrations,  while it  saved union prerogatives,  did not
change  flexibility  at  workplace  level,  already  recognised  by  the
Acuerdo Macro.
Despite a general  trade union retreat,  the decade of the 1990s
witnessed  bitter  conflicts  and  active  popular  resistance.  In  the
privatised public industries,  the processes of rationalisation and the
closure  of  production  sites  led  to  job  loss  and  strong  workforce
opposition.  When  company  restructuring  impacted  areas  of  the
country  dependent  on  one  productive  sector  (metallurgy,  oil
extraction, sugar cane plantations, among others), resistance translated
into broader mobilisations involving the rebellion of civil society as a
whole,  as  in  the  case  of  the  communities  of  Villa  Constitución
(province of Santa Fe), Cutral Có and Plaza Huincul (Neuquén), and
Tartagal and General Mosconi (Salta). In all these cases, trade unions
played a secondary role. 
After four years of recession, massive demonstrations took place
in December 2001, bringing down the government and pulling down
the  edifice  of  monetary  convertibility.  Gradually,  the  end  of  the
recession  revitalised  trade  unions.  Since  2003  the  country  has
experienced a steady economic recovery with rates of growth around 8
to 9 per cent annually, which has three important consequences for
trade unions. First and foremost, unemployment fell to 8.5 per cent in
2007 after climbing in October 2001 to 21.5. Second, the number of
workers  employed  in  the  private  formal  sector  has  increased  22.4
percentage points since 2001, thus allowing unions to maintain their
positions  in  certain  strategic  industries  (such  as  automotive,
telecommunication,  energy,  transport)  that  although affected by  the
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1990s restructuring, were among the first to take advantage of the post
2003  favourable  business  climate,  thus  strengthening  trade  unions
associational power. Third, capitalists have been inclined to concede
workers’ demands in the face of potential disruptions to the productive
process  in  the  midst  of  growing profits  and backward wage  levels
(wage-labour participation in the gross aggregated value fell from 38.2
per cent to 28.8 due to currency devaluation after the peak of the crisis
in  December  2001).  Thus,  this  positive  economic  cycle  has  been
fertile soil for trade union demands for higher salaries, both through
collective  bargaining  and  industrial  action.  Indeed,  trade  union
negotiations  and  struggles  succeeded  in  raising  real  wages  in  the
formal private sector above those of 2001, though within an uncertain
climate due to increasing inflationary pressures. Today, more than fifty
years  later,  the  traditional  reformism  of  trade  unions  in  Argentina
seems to stumble over the same stone.
7. Conclusion
In Argentine history, politics and trade unionism have been for many
years intertwined. Indeed, a distinctive feature about trade unionism in
Argentina is its comparatively higher level of political involvement,
which is to a great extent embedded in the origins and characteristics
of the system.
The role of the State as trade unions’ promoter and guarantor, its
direct participation in collective bargaining, and its power to weaken
or  strengthen  trade  unions  through  administrative  and  legal
prerogatives, rendered political influence within the State a resource
of vital importance. This institutional design was a component in a
wider  political  project  to  industrialise  the  country  by  applying  an
import-substitution model. Most sections of the trade union movement
enrolled in the  Peronist political movement in mid 1940s, obtaining
labour laws, benefits and organisational power, unthinkable just a few
years earlier, but through political rather than industrial mobilisation. 
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Within this politicised environment, the structure and dynamics
of  collective  bargaining  meant  that  unions,  employers  and
governments, agreed not only on industrial and productive matters but
also  on  macroeconomic  policies.  Moreover,  beyond  industrial
negotiations, unions aimed to influence national economic policy to
meet  their  demands  concerning  wages  and  levels  of  employment.
Thus,  trade  unions  pressured  public  authorities  as  much  as  they
pressured capitalists;  often mounting political  strategies  to confront
industrial troubles, and frequently, capitalists and trade unions jointly
pressured  governments  for  industrial  policies  in  specific  economic
sectors.  And  typical  of  Keynesian  macroeconomic  management,
governments  needed  unions  to  concert  industrial  peace  and  social
pacts. To put it bluntly, trade unions’ leadership had pursued from the
mid  1940s  Keynesian  economic  policies,  which  furthered
industrialisation  and  infrastructure  development,  within  a  political
project in which harmony and cooperation were considered essential
for  national  and  common prosperity.  Within  this  context,  the  State
played a role of social mediation, fixing rules and setting agreements
for a redistribution of the national wealth. If this was the ideal model,
then both the ruling classes and grassroots mobilisations of the part of
workers posed threats to the social pact. So did economic crisis.
Additionally, due to the instability of Argentine democracy and
the political proscription of  Peronism between 1955 and 1973, trade
unions, usually through the CGT, fulfilled a political role too. Every
government, democratic or military, was forced to negotiate with the
CGT (or repress it).  Within this context,  national  strikes  played an
important role as manifestations of political strength. 
Because of this multifaceted trade union involvement in national
politics,  is not surprising that levels of labour unrest in the country
have  remained  comparatively  high.  The  political  and  institutional
framework  that  favoured  strike  proneness  and  unions’ orientation
towards  collective  action,  produced,  however,  a  deficit  in  terms of
internal  democracy  and  reinforced  bureaucratic  leaderships.  While
there is certainly a top-down culture of decision-making in Argentine
trade unions, there is also a culture of grassroots mobilisation, usually
expressed  through  comisiones  internas,  which  has  been  able  to
challenge this dominant model. 
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Within a comparative international  perspective,  one can depict
the  history  of  trade  unionism  in  Argentina  as  an  example  of  a
particularly conflictive movement. Within a social context whose deep
inequalities  promote  radicalisation  of  conflict,  workers  have
simultaneously mobilised in the streets, in the workplace, and in the
courts. 
The  history  of  trade  unionism  and  workers’  struggles  in
Argentina is thus a continuous, alternating movement of mobilisation
and counter-mobilisation inscribed within different economic cycles.
In this sense, the crisis of 1951-2 and the measures adopted by various
governments  in  the  period  1955-1976  to  curb  trade  unions’
organisational  power,  to  maintain  capitalist  control  of  the  labour
process and to increase productivity,  represented the background to
the neo-liberal capitalist restructuring that started in Argentina by the
mid 1970s and culminated in the privatisation and labour flexibility
policies of the 1990s.
While in recent years Argentina, especially in the wake of the
2001  financial  crisis,  has  been  the  site  of  a  range  of  diverse  and
alternative labour protests, including the road blocks organised by the
unemployed, after 2002, in a context of economic growth and political
stability,  labour  struggles  have  resumed  with  trade  unions  and
formally  employed  workers  as  the  main  protagonists.  While
historically  the  trade  unions  have  not  produced  more  than  a  trade
unions  consciousness,  their  internal  struggles  and  active  presence
remain expression of workers’ opposition to the contradictions that the
development of the capitalist system constantly generate.
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